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REFORMING THE UNITED STATES' ECONOMIC MODEL AFTER
THE FAILURE OF UNFETTERED FINANCIAL CAPITALISM
RICHARD B. FREEMAN*
Once about a time, not so long ago, the U.S. began an experiment in
laissez faire economics. To many, the high taxes and regulations of the
1940s and 1950s seemed to be stifling the free market. President Reagan
argued that government was not the solution to any economic problem, but
was instead the problem itself. If the U.S. lowered taxes on the wealthy,
they would work harder and produce more output. If the country reduced
regulations on business, management would make better decisions and
raise economic growth. Weaker union coverage and labor regulations
would make the labor market more flexible and lower unemployment. If
firms paid executives with performance-based contracts, the interests of
executives would align with those of shareholders to their joint benefit. All
of these changes would raise the incomes of the rich more than the incomes
of other citizens and some would redistribute income to the wealthy, but
the promise was that eventually the benefits would trickle down so that
everyone would gain.
Moving toward a laissez faire economy appealed to conservatives
more than to liberals, to economists more than to other social scientists or
lawyers, and to Republicans more than to Democrats. But nearly all groups
supported some parts of the experiment. The Carter Administration initi-
ated deregulation of major industries. The Reagan administration cut taxes
on the wealthy and weakened regulatory laws. The Bush I administration
sought to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act that separated commercial and in-
vestment banking. The Clinton Administration made stock options and
bonuses the preferred mode of compensation for executives,1 joined with
* Richard B. Freeman holds the Herbert Ascherman Chair in Economics at Harvard University,
and is Faculty Director of the Labor and Worklife Program at the Harvard Law School. This Article is
based on the 2009 Kenneth M. Piper Lecture at the Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. The 1993 Tax Law denied a corporate tax deduction for executive wages in excess of $1
million but continued the tax and accounting advantages for bonuses and stock options. With a thirty
five percent corporate tax rate, the change made it thirty-five percent more costly for corporations to
pay their top executives above $1 million per year than before. Companies shifted compensation toward
options, which had the advantage that recipients did not pay taxes until they were exercised and which
were not counted as an expense on corporate books if they were issued in the money. Tamara Loomis,
In Shift Toward Performance-Based Compensation, Salaries Out, Bonuses In, CORP. COuNS., July 25,
2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id= 184663194498.
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Republicans to repeal Glass-Steagall, and reappointed laissez faire aficio-
nado Alan Greenspan to head the Federal Reserve. The George W. Bush
administration reduced taxes on the wealthy and appointed opponents of
deregulation to head regulatory agencies. From the mid-1980s on, the Fed-
eral Reserve continually weakened the barriers between commercial and
investment banks through administrative rulings. 2
As U.S. employment grew rapidly and the rate of unemployment
dropped below the rate in advanced Europe in the 1990s, international eco-
nomic agencies came to believe that the U.S. was the peak capitalist econ-
omy that others should copy. The Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development's Jobs Study in 1994 blamed high unemployment in the
European Union on inflexible labor markets.3 Many attributed the more
rapid growth of productivity in the U.S. than in Europe in the 1990s to the
U.S.'s flexible market-driven economy. The World Bank and International
Monetary Fund touted the U.S. model in their "Washington Consensus"
policy recommendations to developing countries. That the promised
trickle-down never reached the average American worker was largely ig-
nored.
In the late 1990s, some analysts argued that the experiment had suc-
ceeded so much that it created a "new economy" that obsolesced the busi-
ness cycle. The Federal Reserve had the monetary policy tools and
knowledge to produce great moderation in the volatility of economic ag-
gregates. 4 James Stock and Mark Watson estimated that the standard devia-
tion of annual growth rates in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the
United States dropped from 2.7 percent in 1960-1983 to 1.6 percent in
1984-2001, though they attributed more of the change to "luck" than to
improved policy.5 Some analysts downplayed the possible adverse effects
of the nation's huge trade deficits, of the increased use of debt to fund con-
sumption, or of the great reliance on leverage in finance. If these were mar-
ket-driven developments, they had to be good. Real business cycle analysts
believed that cyclic ups and downs reflected changes in technology and
2. See PBS, Frontline: The Wall Street Fix: Mr. Weill Goes to Washington: The Long Demise of
Glass-Steagall, May 8, 2003,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/weill/demise.html.
3. OECD, THE OECD JOBS STUDY: FACTS, ANALYSIS, STRATEGIES (1994),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/51/1941679.pdf.
4. Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Meet-
ings of the Eastern Economic Association, Washington, DC: The Great Moderation (Feb. 20, 2004),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/Speeches/2004/20040220/default.htm.
5. James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why? (Nat'l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. W9127, Aug. 2002), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-327153.
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tastes, not the vagaries of financial markets. The Great Depression was a
dim memory. To some it had never really occurred.
I. DEREGULATING THE CROWN JEWEL OF CAPITALISM, FINANCE
Deregulation of banking and finance began in 1980 under the Carter
Administration, when Congress enacted the Depository Institutions De-
regulation and Monetary Control Act which gave savings and loan associa-
tions new lending authority and the right to offer new savings products.6
The Reagan Administration followed by freeing banks and savings and
loan institutions to compete with higher interest rates in the money market
and to make commercial loans. 7 While deregulation and associated loos-
ened accounting practices were not the sole cause of the savings and loan
(S&L) crisis that followed, those policies created the incentives and oppor-
tunities for the fraud and criminal looting of banks that destroyed nearly
750 S&Ls and sent some 3,600 bankers to prison. 8 The cost of the S&L
disaster to taxpayers was on the order of $125 billion,9 and may have
caused greater harm to the economy by lowering household construction
for years. Regardless of one's views of the benefits of deregulation, the
disaster should have warned the Treasury, Federal Reserve, and Congress
that deregulating banking and finance was risky. Deregulation might
improve the long run functioning of the financial sector, but the path to the
long run was strewn with pitfalls.
A. Thin Ice. Proceed with Caution.
The second phase in legislative deregulation began in 1993. Paying lit-
tle attention to the lesson of the S&L crisis, Secretary of the Treasury
Robert Rubin led the Clinton Administration to join Congressional Repub-
licans in repealing the Glass-Steagall barriers between commercial and
investment banking.' 0 The immediate precipitant of the repeal was the
6. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (1980).
7. The major piece of legislation was the Gam-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982,
H.R. 6267, 97th Cong. (1982) (enacted). President Reagan referred to the banking deregulatory agenda
when he signed it. Ronald Reagan, President, Remarks on Signing the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982 (Oct. 15, 1982), available at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/101582b.htm.
8. FINANCIAL TIMES reports that 1,072 bankers were jailed for S&L crimes and another 2,558
bankers were jailed for other offenses, which were often S&L-linked. Gillian Tett, Insight: A matter of
retribution, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, available at
http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ftnewsid=fo090320091244573891.
9. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (1996), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ai96123.pdf.
10. PBS, supra note 2.
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merger of Citigroup and Traveler's Insurance into a giant conglomerate."l
If Glass-Steagall had remained the law, the merged firm would have had to
divest some of its businesses and be less profitable. The new merged con-
glomerate bank pressured Washington to repeal the Act, and Rubin (who
was also the former CEO of Goldman Sachs) delivered what the financial
community had long wanted. 12 Indicative of the spirit of the time, the
WALL STREET JOURNAL greeted the repeal of Glass-Steagall with the head-
line "Finally, 1929 Is Put to Rest."'13 Many in economics and finance be-
lieved that the efficient market hypothesis characterized the financial
market and thus that deregulation would improve economic performance.
Alan Greenspan, head of the Federal Reserve, knew that regulation was
useless: "[F]ree, competitive markets are by far the unrivaled way to organ-
ize economies. We have tried regulation. None meaningfully worked."' 14
B. The Country Hadn't Trusted an Unfettered Wall Street Since the
1920s
1. Time to Have Another Go
The new deregulatory regime freed Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,
Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Steams to form huge holding
companies that conducted business on all sides of the finance market. It
allowed Citigroup to underwrite and trade mortgage-backed securities and
collateralized debt obligations and to create investment vehicles to buy the
securities (and to hire Mr. Rubin after he left the Clinton Administration).15
Moreover, since no agency had jurisdiction over the full scope of bank
transactions, the banks could evade some government oversight if they so
desired. If this did not give them enough wiggle room, the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Bill that eliminated Glass-Steagall contained a provision that further
restricted government oversight to voluntary monitoring in some areas. 16
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Robert McGough, The New Financial Landscape: Finally, 1929 Is Put to Rest, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 25, 1999 at A20.
14. As quoted by Henry Waxman at the Congressional Hearings of October 23, 2008: "[Y]ou had
an ideology, you had a belief that free, competitive-and this is your statement-'I do have an ideol-
ogy. My judgment is that free, competitive markets are by far the unrivaled way to organize economies.
We have tried regulation. None meaningfully worked.' That was your quote." PBS Newshour, Green-
span Admits 'Flaw' to Congress, Predicts More Economic Problems, Oct. 23, 2008,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec08/crisishearing- 0-23.html.
15. PBS, supra note 2.
16. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, P.L. 106-102 (Nov. 12, 1999).
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Great Depression? S&L crisis? The "best and brightest" had new tools
for risk management. This time the unfettered financial market was going
to glisten and glitter as the crown jewel of capitalism.
To be sure, some observers worried that deregulation might not work
out as promised. Analysts at MOTHER JONES predicted that overturning the
Glass-Steagall Bill would "pave the way for a new round of record-
shattering financial industry mergers, dangerously concentrating political
and economic power [and] create too-big-to-fail institutions that are some-
day likely to drain the public treasury as taxpayers bail out imperiled finan-
cial giants to protect the stability of the nation's banking system."'17 But no
one in authority paid attention to MOTHER JONES. The Secretary of the
Treasury/future chairman of Citigroup, the head of the Federal Reserve,
and the academic and Wall Street experts surely knew more about how the
finance market operated than some radical critics at MOTHER JONES.
Wall Street responded to deregulation with an array of mathematically
sophisticated financial instruments designed to spread risks. But almost
simultaneously the banks increased risk by increasing their leverage so they
could make more money with less capital. Extolling credit default swaps as
providing the correct insurance for the new financial products while ignor-
ing the increased leverage, Greenspan was ecstatic: "As the market for
credit default swaps expands and deepens, the collective knowledge held
by market participants is exactly reflected in the prices of these derivative
instruments [which] embody all relevant market prices of the financial
instruments issued by potential borrowers."' 18
Great Depression? Ancient times. Savings and loan crisis? Many of
the banks that went under were in Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Colorado,
Kansas, and Missouri, far from Wall Street. 19 Surely the Wall Street finan-
ciers were a lot smarter. And the efficient market theorem said the market
could not be wrong.
During the 1990s, countries around the world deregulated their finan-
cial sectors to join the global capital market. If these policies had succeeded
in improving financial stability and raising economic growth, U.S. deregu-
17. Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, Robert Rubin Rewrites the Rules, MOTHER JONES,
Nov. 9, 1999, available at http://motherjones.com/politics/1999/l 1/robert-rubin-rewrites-rules.
18. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks before the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions: International Financial Risk Management (Nov. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/2002/20021119/default.htm.
19. Of the 1617 banks that failed in this period, 599 were in Texas, 122 in Oklahoma, seventy in
Louisiana, sixty-nine in Kansas, fifty-nine in Colorado, and forty-one in Missouri. This compares to
thirty-four in New York. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE COPRORATION, THE BANKING CRISES OF
THE 1980s AND EARLY 1990S: SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historicallhistory/3-85.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
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lation could reasonably be expected to succeed as well. But the 1990s was
a period of near continuous financial crisis. There was the 1994-1995
Mexican Crisis, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 1998 Russian Crisis,
the late 1990s-early 2000s Argentine financial crisis, and on and on.20
Despite its deep commitment to the laissez faire agenda, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) found no evidence that countries that liberalized
their financial markets did better than those that had not done so. 21 Could it
be that laissez faire finance did not work according to plan? The propo-
nents of deregulation thought not. The problem was that crisis countries
had incompletely developed financial markets. If the countries had trans-
parent efficient institutions like Wall Street, things would have gone well.
No one outside of the MOTHER JONES crowd could imagine that the U.S.
capital market would crash like those in Latin America, Asia, or the ex-
Soviet Union.
Another warning sign came in 1998. Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM), a five billion dollar hedge fund with over $130 billion in highly
leveraged assets and huge off-balance sheet derivative positions, was sud-
denly unable to pay its bills and was about to crash.22 LTCM's sophisti-
cated trading strategies, developed under the direction of Nobel Laureates
in economics and Wall Street insiders, proved riskier than the firm's risk
models had predicted.23 Fearing that the collapse of LTCM would set off a
domino effect in financial markets that would force other highly leveraged
hedge funds and financial houses into bankruptcy as asset prices fell, the
New York Federal Reserve worked with the biggest Wall Street banks to
have them take over LTCM's debt.24
20. See generally INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: APRIL 2009 (2009),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf. Table 3.2 lists 1990s finan-
cial crises and associated recessions in Australia, France, Finland, Greece, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom in the advanced countries. Id. at 107 tbl.3.2. Table 3.6 gives crises associated with
deregulation of the mortgage market. Id. at 129 tbl.3.6. Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia identified 124
systemic banking crises over the period 1970 to 2007. Luc Laeven & Fabian Valencia, Systemic Bank-
ing Crises: A New Database 5 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 08/224, 2008), available at
www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wpO8224.pdf.
21. M. Ayhan Kose et al., Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal 4 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Work-
ing Paper No. 06/189, 2006), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Filces/rc/papers/2006/08globaleconomics -rogoff/20060823.pdf.
22. Sungard Ambit ERisk, Case Study: LTCM-Long-
Term Capital Management, http://www.erisk.com/Leaming/CaseStudies/Long-
TermCapitalManagemen.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2010).
23. Id. In September 1998, the heavily leveraged hedge fund with mountains of derivatives told
the Federal Reserve that it could not cover $4 billion in losses due to financial problems that resulted
from Russia defaulting on its debt. Id.
24. See Wikipedia, Long-Term Capital Management, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-
Term._CapitalManagement (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
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Thin ice? LTCM had fallen into a frozen lake and drowned. The Fed-
eral Reserve and the financial community could not have asked for a
stronger warning signal to proceed with caution.
Citing the failure of LTCM at a seminar at the Chicago Kent-lIT
commodities law institute on October 15, 1998, Brooksley Born, the head
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, warned that the lack of
transparency, excess of leverage, and absence of sufficient prudential con-
trols in over-the-counter derivatives posed a danger to U.S. financial mar-
kets.25 In the spring of 1999, she sought public debate on whether
derivatives should be regulated in some fashion. In response, Secretary of
the Treasury Rubin, Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) Commis-
sioner Arthur Levitt, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers,
and Alan Greenspan moved almost instantly to squelch her for "cast[ing]
the shadow of regulatory uncertainty over an otherwise thriving market."26
Congress enacted the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which pre-
empted derivatives from oversight under state gaming laws and excluded
certain swaps from being considered securities under SEC rules.27
2. Thin ice? Caution? Off with Her Head! Within a Year, Born Left the
Government.
Financial economists and macro-economists paid close attention to
these developments. Labor experts did not; banking and finance were not
part of our territory. When I wrote America Works,28 which gave "critical
thoughts" on the performance of the U.S. labor market and economy, I
noted the country's successes in generating full employment, creating new
opportunities for women and immigrants, increasing productivity, and pro-
ducing high mobility of labor that kept unemployment spells short. The
weaknesses of the U.S. economic model that troubled me were the failure
to distribute the gains of economic growth to the bulk of U.S. workers, the
U.S.'s third-world level of inequality, and the inability of workers who
sought unions to gain that representation. 29 Finance entered my analysis
only peripherally through its link to executive stock options and bonuses
25. Brooksley Born, Chairperson, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Remarks at Chicago
Kent-lIT Commodities Law Institute: The Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management L.P. (Oct. 15,
1998), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/opaborn-37.htm.
26. Lawrence H. Summers, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Testimony before the
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry on the CFTC Concept Release (July 30,
1998), available at http://treasury.gov/press/releases/rr2616.htm.
27. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-411 (2000).
28. RICHARD B. FREEMAN, AMERICA WORKS: CRITICAL THOUGHTS ON THE EXCEPTIONAL U.S.
LABOR MARKET (2007).
29. Id. at 1, 3.
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that seemed designed to enrich CEOs and their cronies rather than to incen-
tivize and reward exceptional performance. 30 Why were options not in-
dexed to other economic variables? Why did firms issue new options when
old ones went under water? Why did firms backdate stock options? Why
did some firms issue options immediately after the temporary fall in stock
prices post 9-11 ?31 1 noted the criminal behavior that led to the 2001 crash
of Enron and the Worldcom, Tyco, and other scandals, but I never imag-
ined that this was the tip of an iceberg of fraud and risk-taking that endan-
gered the entire economy.
Labor research has shown that unions and labor regulations sometimes
create modest inefficiencies as they increase labor's share of the economic
pie, but it has also shown that these inefficiencies pose no danger to the
economy. 32 Naively I assumed that something similar must be true in capi-
tal markets. If the efficient market hypothesis was right, finance created no
problems. If the efficient market hypothesis was an exaggeration (as most
empirical studies found it to be), it was surely not such an exaggeration that
deregulating finance risked a second Great Depression. In any case, the
Federal Reserve, the Treasury, SEC, and diverse other agencies still had
enough authority to put a stop to anything truly dangerous. That was their
job.
Thin ice? Put up a no skating sign and make sure banks and other fi-
nancial institutions stay in the safe zone.
II. The Implosion of Finance
In mid-September 2008, the experiment in laissez faire capitalism in
finance came to a sudden, disastrous end. It did not end with T.S. Eliot's
whimper, but with a bang.33 Finance never ends with whimpers. It ends
with crashes and panics that reduce the cumulated assets of years to rubble
all at once. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL referred to the September 2008
implosion of banking and finance precipitated by the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy as "The Weekend Wall Street Died."'34 Credit froze. Banks had
"toxic assets" on their books of questionable value which made other banks
30. Id. at 120.
31. Id. The editor of the Harvard Business Review was so incensed by this behavior as to de-
nounce these executives on public radio as "sleaze balls and profiteering ghouls." Id.
32. Id. at 86-87.
33. Cf T.S. ELIOT, The Hollow Men (1925), available at
http://zachd.com/writing/hollowmen.html ("This is the way the world ends. Not with a bang but a
whimper.").
34. Susanne Craig et al., The Weekend That Wall Street Died, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2008, avail-
able at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 123051066413538349.html.
[Vol 85:2
REFORMING THE UNITED STATES' ECONOMIC MODEL
unwilling to deal with them. They had off-the-books subsidiaries of un-
known value and debt. Greenspan's fabled swaps turned out to be useless,
or rather worse than useless, as they spread the crash and panic more
widely. American International Group (AIG), the big insurance firm, was
about to crash. The grand poobah was in a state of "shocked disbelief' as
"[t]he whole intellectual edifice [on which his policies hinged] col-
lapsed." 35
Terrified that the U.S. was falling through thin ice and that Great De-
pression II loomed, the Bush Administration, the Federal Reserve, and the
leaders of Congress and business and finance asked Congress to give bil-
lions of dollars to the Treasury to save finance from finance. In October
2008, over the opposition of many Congressional Republicans, Congress
enacted the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) that gave the Treasury
authority to spend up to $700 billion to promote financial market stabil-
ity. 36 The money was first supposed to buy toxic assets from the banks.
Then the Treasury decided to add to the capital stock of the financial firms
by buying preferred stock. Then President Bush declared that he had the
authority to spend the money on whatever would mitigate the crisis. The
Treasury ended up establishing eleven programs to which it allocated $529
billion as of November 30, 2009-ranging from equity purchases, loans,
and guarantees to aid for the auto industry and small businesses. 37 The
Federal Reserve lowered interest rates and undertook diverse innovative
financial maneuvers to provide liquidity to credit markets.38 The Congres-
sional Oversight Panel estimated that the maximum federal exposure at the
end of 2009 was $3.1 trillion. 39
The influx of government support ended the financial panic. In its
2009 year-end report, the Congressional Oversight Panel concluded that
TARP helped stabilize financial markets and restore the flow of credit but
warned that the banking sector was still on shaky ground.40 The Treasury
had applied "stress tests" to banks that did not revalue toxic assets at cur-
35. Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Flaws in Deregulatory Approach, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 2008, at BI.
36. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: TAKING STOCK: WHAT
HAS THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM ACHIEVED? 4 (2009), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-120909-report.pdf.
37. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 36, at tbl. 25.
38. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 36, at 100.
39. Id. at 77. At the peak of the disaster, BLOOMBERG estimated that the full value of the bailout
was over $7.4 trillion, the bulk of which consisted of lending programs and guarantees, almost all under
the Fed and FDIC. Mark Pittman & Bob Ivry, U.S. Taxpayers Risk $9.7 Trillion on Bailout Programs
(Update]), BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb 9, 2009, available
at http://www.bloomberg.conapps/news?pid--washingtonstory&sid=aGq2B3XeGKok.
40. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 36, at 103.
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rent market price. This meant that the banks were weaker than the stress
tests indicated unless recovery went smoothly and restored the value of
those assets. With near-zero-interest loans, some institutions started to
speculate in ways that risked setting off new asset bubbles. Most banks
used the government cash and guarantees to re-capitalize themselves but
did not make the new loans that would fund investment or help mortgagees
refinance their homes.4 1 In September 2009, five Wall Street investment
banks held thirty-seven percent of the sector's assets while ten global banks
held a sizable proportion of world banking assets; this made them all "too
big to fail."42 Would they take on riskier investments than otherwise,
knowing that the government would come to their rescue (if not now, then
later) and thereby precipitate another meltdown of finance?
The implosion of Wall Street brought near immediate recession to the
U.S. economy and economies worldwide. Real gross domestic output in the
U.S. decreased at an annual rate of 5.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008
and by 6.4 percent in the first quarter of 2009 versus activity in the year-
ago periods. 43 Other countries also registered substantial drops in GDP.44
In response, the Obama Administration pushed the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act through Congress to provide a Keynesian stimulus to the
economy. 45 Governments elsewhere also ran sizable Keynesian fiscal defi-
cits. U.S. GDP turned positive in the third quarter of 2009.46 Stimuli pro-
grams in other economies also succeeded in restoring positive economic
41. Id. at 153.
42. For the U.S., the five largest bank holding companies in terms of total assets as of December
31, 2009 had $8.2 trillion in assets, as reported by the FDIC. See National Information Center, Top 50
BHCs, http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2010). The
Federal Reserve's flow of accounts file shows all bank holding companies having $27.21 trillion in
assets as of the last quarter of 2009compared to $22.528 trillion in assets for all BHCs. This gives the
five largest thirty percent of bank holding assets. See Table L. 112 Bank Holding Companies, available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/Current/zlr-4.pdf (Mar. 11, 2010). The CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT PANEL REPORT, at table 12, shows a market share of about thirty-seven percent for the four
banks with the most deposits. Id at 46 tbl.12; compare Mark Whitehouse, The Outlook: Economic
Crisis Ebbs, Systemic Risks Don 't, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2009, at A2 (reporting that the world's ten
largest banks have seventy percent of global banking assets), with Bankers Almanac, Bank List-Top
Banks in the World (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.bankersalmanac.com/addcon/infobank/bank-
rankings.aspx (showing the world's ten largest banks with less than half of global banking assets).
43. TradingEconomics, United States GDP Growth Rate,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/Economics/GDP-Growth.aspx?Symbol=USD (last visited Mar. 17,
2010).
44. See Marcus Walker, Record GDP Drop Sharpens Pain Across Euro Zone, WALL ST. J., May
16, 2009, at A5.
45. See Lee E. Ohanian, The $787 Billion Mistake, FORBES, June 10, 2009, available at
http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/09/american-recovery-reinvestment-act-roosevelt-opinions-
contributors-depression.html.
46. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 2009 (Second
Estimate) (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2010/gdp4q09_2nd.htm.
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growth. Stock prices increased. Some major banks reported large profits,
which encouraged the bankers to begin again paying themselves huge bo-
nuses. Executives in other firms benefited from options that their firms
granted them when the market had bottomed out or from grants of even
larger numbers of shares than in the past (so that the options had the same
value as in the past)-even though their decisions had nothing to do with
the increase in stock prices. But even with the TARP bailout of banks and
the stimulus, the financial sector and economy remained fragile; the labor
market in particular showed little sign of recovery.47 Many feared that re-
duced government support for the banks or reduced deficit spending would
precipitate another, possibly worse, economic recession.48
The end result of the experiment in deregulation of finance was thus
the opposite of what the aficionados of laissez faire intended. It created a
finance sector and real economy more dependent on the government than
before. It raised suspicions about competence and honesty not only in
banking but in business in general. 49
A. Thin ice. Take precaution. Or suffer the consequences.
1. Effect on Labor
The 2008-2009 recession hurt working Americans more severely than
did earlier post-Depression recessions. The number of jobs fell by nearly
eight million from 2007 to October 2009.50 The employment-population
ratio fell from sixty-three percent to 58.5 percent. 51 Unemployment at the
end of 2009 hovered around ten percent.52 "Duration of joblessness was the
47. See Martin Neil Baily, Senior Fellow and Bernard L. Schwartz Chair, The Brookings Inst.,
Testimony to the Senate Democratic Policy Committee: Putting Americans Back to Work: Competing
Visions for Job Creation (Dec. 16, 2009), available at
http://dpc.senate.gov/hearings/hearing52/baily.pdf
48. See Edward Harrison, Obama: Debt Could Cause a Double Dip Recession, NAKED
CAPITALISM, Dec. 18, 2009, http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/ll/obama-debt-could-cause-a-
double-dip-recession.html.
49. Gallup.com, Business and Industry Sector Ratings,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/12748/Business-lndustry-Sector-Ratings.aspx (Aug. 2009); Gallup.com,
Honesty/Ethics in Professions, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1654/Honesty-Ethics-Professions.aspx
(Nov. 2009).
50. See Josh Bivens, Budgeting For Recovery I (Econ. Pol'y Inst., Briefing Paper No. 253, 2010),
available at http://epi.3cdn.net/1616707e0c784d8134_4nm6becsb.pdf.
51. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey,
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data tool=latestnumbers&series id = LNS 123000
00 (change output options to "from 2000 to 2010" and click "go") (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
52. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Regional and State Employment and Unemployment Summary
(Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.stats.bls.gov/news.release/laus.nr0.htm.
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longest since the Great Depression. '53 Millions were on involuntary short
term and "[m]illions more were too discouraged by lack of jobs to seek
work. ' 54 The Bureau of Labor Statistics' most inclusive definition of labor
underutilization reached 17.5 percent of the work force in October 2009.55
The conventionally defined unemployment rate rose in the U.S. above that
in the European Union. 56 The International Labor Organization estimated
that jobs may not recover in the advanced countries until 2015.57 For the
U.S., only an economic miracle would restore full employment in that time
span. In the 1993-1998 boom, the employment-population rate increased
by 2.9 percentage points, or nearly 0.6 percentage points per year.58 If em-
ployment began to increase in 2010 at the rate as in the boom, the employ-
ment-population rate would not reattain its pre-recession level of sixty-
three percent until 2017; however, a lower rate of job creation, or one that
began later, would delay full recovery in the job market until later in the
decade. The rate of unemployment could easily remain on the order of six
to eight percent for close to a decade.
Extended periods of joblessness are toxic for economic well-being.
Young persons who seek first jobs and experienced workers who lose jobs
in a weak job market suffer income losses that last their lives. 59 Unem-
ployment reduces happiness by as much as the loss of a family member.60
The effects of a job loss on health are more equivocal. Christopher Ruhm
53. Richard Freeman, A Jobless Recovery?, PROJECT SYNDICATE, Dec. 9, 2009,
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/rfreeman 1/English.
54. Id.
55. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation-October 2009 (Nov. 6, 2009),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit 11062009.pdf. This is the BLS's U-6 measure that
includes total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed part time for
economic reasons, as a percent of the civilian labor force plus all marginally attached workers.
56. See Freeman, supra note 53. Advanced Europe, Canada, and Japan also suffered major job
losses and high rates of unemployment. Spain, with its temporary employment contracts, had the big-
gest increase in unemployment since firms can fire workers quickly. See US Bureau of Labor Statistics,
International unemployment rates and employment indexes, available at
http://www.bls.gov/fls/intl unemployment--rates-monthly.pdf (Apr. 10, 2010). Some countries, such as
Germany and Sweden in Europe and Korea in Asia, have "hidden" their joblessness by paying firms to
keep workers on board. Richard Freeman, Remarks at the AEA Panel Discussion: Europe's Role and
Position in the Current Economic Crisis Annual Meetings in Atlanta, Georgia (Jan. 5, 2010).
57. INTERNATIONAL LABouR CONFERENCE 98TH SESSION, GENEVA, JUNE 2009, COMMITTEE OF
THE WHOLE ON CRISIS RESPONSES 6 (2009), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ILC2009/TD 1/ILC98-CPI-TD I -Brief-2009-06-0016- I -En.pdf.
58. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics for the Current Population Survey,
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?datatool=latestnumbers&series-id=LNS 140000
00 (change output options to "from 1993 to 1998" and click "go") (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
59. Till von Wachter & Stefan Bender, In the Right Place at the Wrong Time: The Role of Firms
and Luck in Young Workers' Careers 37 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, IZA Discussion Paper No. 1348,
2004).
60. Andrew E. Clark & Andrew J. Oswald, Unhappiness and Unemployment, 104 ECON. J. 648,
655 (1994).
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found that on average health improves in a recession.61 But, looking at
high-seniority men who lost their job in the 1970s and 1980s, Daniel Sulli-
van and Till von Wachter estimate that their annual mortality increased by
ten to fifteen percent, 62 which implies a loss in life expectancy of one to
one and a half years. Analysis of the mental health of workers in five coun-
tries shows that loss of employment reduced mental well-being while mov-
ing from unemployment to a full-time regular job improved mental well-
being. 63
Previous post-World War II finance-induced recessions provide some
insight into how the 2008-2009 crisis might impact workers over the long
run. The early 1990s housing bubble and banking collapse in Sweden
raised unemployment from 1.8 percent in 1990 to 9.6 percent in 1994.64 In
the ensuing recovery, unemployment bottomed out in 2001 at five per-
cent.65 In 2007, sixteen years after the crisis but before the 2008-2009 re-
cession, the rate of unemployment was 6.2 percent-more than three times
as high as in 1990.66 In 1997, the Asian financial crisis struck Korea. The
IMF and U.S. insisted that Korea raise interest rates and undertake "Wash-
ington Consensus" style reforms to receive the financial assistance it
needed to deal with runs on its currency.67 Unemployment rose to around
eight percent, real wages declined, and unions battled management and
government in a futile effort to preserve job security for workers in large
firms. Growth and employment recovered quickly but the new jobs were
primarily in "non-regular" positions with limited benefits and low wages.
Inequality in Korea went from moderate levels to the second highest among
advanced OECD countries, behind only the U.S.68 The recession in Argen-
tina that followed the collapse of the peso in January 2002 raised already
high rates of unemployment, lowered real wages, and increased poverty. 69
Data for 2007-2009 show that the U.S. recession increased inequality
in hourly earnings, annual income, and wealth. Between 2007 and 2009,
usual hourly earnings at the bottom decile increased less than at the me-
61. Christopher J. Ruhm, Are Recessions Good for Your Health?, 115 Q.J. OF ECON. 617, 617
(2000).
62. Daniel Sullivan & Till von Wachter, Job Displacement and Mortality: An Analysis Using
Administrative Data, 124 THE Q.J. OF ECON. 1265 (2009).
63. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD EMPLOYMENT
OUTLOOK, 205, 209 (2008).
64. See Freeman, supra note 53.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See JIM SAXTON, JOINT ECON. COMM. OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, ARGENTINA'S ECONOMIC
CRISIS: CAUSES AND CURES 2 (2003), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/06-13-03.pdf.
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dian, which in turn increased less than at the top decile.70 Earnings in-
creased less for high school graduates without college education than for
college graduates, which in turn increased less than for those with graduate
or professional degrees. 71 Earnings increased less for younger workers than
for older workers, and so on.72 Turning to income, the rate of poverty in the
U.S. rose from 12.5 percent to 13.2 percent, while median household in-
come fell by 3.6 percent in real terms between 2007 and 2008. 73 Since the
recession began in late 2008, poverty and household income figures will
almost certainly show greater losses through 2009. Edward Wolff estimates
that the mean wealth fell less than median wealth between 2007 and 2009,
which implies that inequality in wealth grew.74 The reason for the in-
creased wealth inequality is that the government bailout of banks and
stimulus helped raise share prices, which restored some of the wealth of
persons with considerable equity while the price of houses-which consti-
tute the main wealth of most families-had not recovered by the end of
2009. By contrast, inequality in income and wealth fell in the Great De-
pression, when the fall in asset values was concentrated among the tiny
upper crust that was invested in the stock market. 75
Given the huge impact that financial disasters have on labor, it seems
incumbent that labor scholars examine what went wrong in finance and
participate in debates over ways to reform financial markets. It is difficult
to imagine what could harm American workers and the economy on which
their living standards depend more than financial debacles like that of
2008-2009. Labor experts cannot ignore finance, as most of us have done,
70. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers: Third
Quarter 2007 (Oct. 18, 2007), http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/wkyeng-nr.htm#current (click on
"Third Quarter" for years 2007. 2008, and 2009 to compare).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008 6, 14
(2009), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/releases/archives/incomewealth/014227.html.
74. See Edward N. Wolff, The Squeeze Before the Storm, PATHWAYS, Fall 2009, at 3 ("[M]ean
wealth (in 2007 dollars) fell by 17.3 percent between 2007 and 2009 (to $443,600), median wealth
plunged by an astounding 36.1 percent (to $65,400, about the same level as in 1992!)".
75. See Simon Kuznets & Elizabeth Jenks, Average Levels of Income Shares, 1919-1938, in
SHARES OF UPPER INCOME GROUPS IN INCOME AND SAVINGS 1, 11 (1953); HORST MENDERSHAUSEN,
CHANGES IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION 35 (1946); Thomas Piketty and
Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1918, THE Q.J. OF ECON. 1, 12 (2003);
Wojciech Kopczuk & Emmanuel Saez, Top Wealth Shares in the United States, 1916-2000: Evidence
from Estate Tax Returns (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10399, 2004), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10399. Since a small proportion of the population holds a dispropor-
tionate share of stocks and other fixed assets, whose prices fall in recessions, most cyclic downturns
tend to lower wealth inequality as did the Depression.
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if we are to understand the determinants of labor outcomes and find ways
to improve the economics of working men and women. The remainder of
this essay is a first step in such an examination. I apply the insights of labor
economics to the incentives and rules in finance, in regulatory agencies,
and in politics that helped produce the decisions that led to the financial
collapse. Then I make the case that the U.S. needs groups representing
labor from unions to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to exercise
countervailing power to Wall Street and business in economic policy-
making to reform those incentives and rules for the good of workers and
our market economy at large.
2. What Went Wrong: The Incentives of Big Bucks
The first thing that strikes anyone about the Wall Street debacle and
the disasters that struck Enron and other firms earlier in the decade is the
huge amount of money paid to those responsible for the disasters. Execu-
tive compensation in the U.S. allows top management to earn massive
amounts for meeting or seeming to meet performance criteria that manage-
ment sets for itself. In 2000 or so, American executives were making
roughly 300 times the earnings of normal workers with the bulk of their
earnings coming in the form of stock options and bonuses. 76 The top man-
agers in finance were among the highest paid of all. U.S. capitalism has not
always been marked by such earnings differentials. The exceptional pay of
management reflects three to four decades of rising income inequality that
brought Gini coefficients and other measures of inequality to levels compa-
rable to those that existed before the Great Depression. 77 Much of the
1980s-2000s income gain in the U.S. went to the upper ten percent, while
much of the gain among the upper ten percent went to the upper one per-
cent, and much of the gain in the upper one percent went to the upper 0.1
percent and so on.78
Finance benefited more than other sectors from the concentration of
economic gains at the top of the income distribution. Compensation per
full-time equivalent employee for security and commodity brokers in the
finance sector rose from 146 percent above the national average of com-
pensation per full-time equivalent employee in 1990 to 290 percent above
76. G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, WHO RuLEs AMERICA, Sept. 2005,
http://sociology.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html.
77. See Piketty & Saez, supra note 75.
78. See id.; Robert J. Gordon & Ian Dew-Becker, Controversies about the Rise of American
Inequality: A Survey I (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13982, 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w 13982.
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average in 2007.79 In 1990, total compensation for security and commodity
brokers was thirty-one percent of the compensation for federal civilian
employees.80 In 2007, it was ninety-three percent that of federal civilian
employees. 81 Much of the increased incomes went to those in the highest
positions. In 2006, Wall Street paid out $62 billion in bonuses. 82 Some
heads of hedge funds made around $1 billion to or more a year.83 In 2008,
even the banks that received TARP government aid gave out huge bo-
nuses. 84 Given the precarious state of the financial markets and the public
outrage at the banking sector, this behavior has the flavor of "endgame
bargaining" in which agents grab what they can as they go out of the door,
fearful that there is no tomorrow. Apris moi, le d~luge.
In 2008, Greenspan opined that Wall Street collapsed in part because
risk modelers limited their data analysis to periods of time when the market
was doing well. 85 That the "best and brightest" or their bosses atop the big
banks were not aware that they should take account of experiences in ear-
lier periods boggles the mind. They had ample warning that something was
amiss with risk models when LTCM crashed and that something was amiss
with accounting practices when Enron crashed. Why did they fail to react?
Rather than blaming ignorance or incompetence, economic analysis sug-
gests that, cui bono, executives focused on short term data and ignored
warning signs because such behavior was profitable for them. The compen-
sation system for executives in the U.S. gives huge bonuses and stock op-
tions if executives report high profits and/or raise share prices. They can do
this in several ways.
79. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 6.2C. Compensation of Employees by Industry,
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N (choose table 6.2c, then choose
1990 for the "First Year" and "Last Year," then click "Update") (last visited Feb. 27, 2010); Bureau of
Economic Analysis, Table 6.2D. Compensation of Employees by Industry,
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N (choose table 6.2d, then choose
2007 for the "First Year" and "Last Year," then click "Update") (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
80. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 6.2C. Compensation of Employees by Industry,
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N (choose table 6.2c, then choose
1990 for the "First Year" and "Last Year," then click "Update") (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
81. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 6.2C. Compensation of Employees by Industry,
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N (choose table 6.2c, then choose
1997 for the "First Year" and "Last Year," then click "Update") (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
82. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, We Deserve a Better Bailout, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 10,
2010, available at http://www.usnews.com/opinion/mzuckerman/articles/2008/10/03/we-deserve-a-
better-bailout.html.
83. Jenny Anderson and Julie Creswell, Top Hedge Fund Managers Earn over $240 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/24/business/24hedge.html?_r- I &fta=y&pagewanted=all.
84. Ben White, What Red Ink? Wall Street Paid Hefty Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/29/business/29bonus.html.
85. Patrick Thibodeau, Greenspan: Bad data hurt Wall Street computer models, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/externaVidg/2008/1 0/23/23idg-Greenspan-Bad.html.
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The first way is to improve the real performance of their company, for
instance by making better products or increasing productivity, both of
which expand the production possibility frontier. This is the social justifica-
tion for performance-based pay.
The second way is to redistribute economic rents from either workers
(most of whom lack unions to protect them) or consumers (most of whom
do not read the fine print of financial contracts) to the firm. It is striking
that on the order of seventy-five percent of the credit card industry's con-
sumer-fee income comes from overdraft and insufficient-funds charges,
which at least in part represent consumer ignorance of the cost of those
charges. 86 The industry's opposition to a consumer financial protection
agency reflects the fear that protection against fraudulent or misleading
financial products will squeeze profits and executive pay. This redistribu-
tion does not directly harm national output but enriches executives and
shareholders at the expense of others in the economy. 87
The third mode of response is to game the compensation system.
Since stock options are more valuable when share prices are more variable,
one way to increase the value of options is to make riskier decisions than
may be in the interest of the firm. Wm. Gerard Sanders and Donald Ham-
brick found that firms whose CEO compensation was loaded with options
had greater variation in performance than other firms. 88 If the gains to the
winners exceed the losses to the losers, this would raise total output and
would likely be in the interest of the broader economy. But Sanders and
Hambrick found that riskier behavior produced more big losses than big
gains.89 Another way to game the system is to report transactions on com-
pany income statements and balance sheets in ways that produce short-run
profits that put options in the money. Another way is to rewrite and back-
date stock options. In a simple maze-solving laboratory experiment with
modest stakes for persons solving more mazes, Alexander Gelber and I
found that greater incentives for coming higher in a tournament induced
participants to misreport the number of mazes they had solved.90 The mas-
sive sums available in finance provide far greater incentive for misrepre-
senting performance.
86. Jane J. Kim, Bank Suspends Overdraft Fee Increase, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB123967277269015845.html.
87. It may indirectly affect economic stability by increasing inequality, which leads consumers to
take on greater debt and high earners to take on greater risks to reach the top of the income distribution.
88. Wm. Gerard Sanders & Donald C. Hambrick, Swinging for the Fences: The Effects of CEO
Stock Options on Company Risk Taking and Performance, 50 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 1055, 1076 (2007).
89. Id.
90. Richard B. Freeman & Alexander M. Gelber, Prize Structure and Information in Tourna-
ments: Experimental Evidence, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 149 (2010).
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For the most part, as Harvard's Rakesh Kurana and Andy Zelleke
have stated, during the 1990s-2000s management seemed to operate corpo-
rations "for the purpose of creating vast wealth for senior executives." 91
Just as Bernard Madoff knew he was running a Ponzi scheme, the big Wall
Street firms knew what they were doing when they packaged sub-prime
mortgages and earned their fees by selling them quickly to others; as one
portfolio manager put it, "a lot of people knew this was bogus, but the
money was too good."' 92 In 2008, the then-chairman of the SEC testified
before Congress that "if honest lending practices had been followed, much
of this crisis quite simply would not have occurred. '93 In the lead-up to the
collapse of the subprime mortgage market, Goldman Sachs and other banks
sold collateralized debt obligations based on those mortgages to pension
funds and other clients while they themselves bet against the securities. 94
This is the moral equivalent of a doctor giving medicine to a patient while
taking out insurance on the patient's life. The head of AIG, Hank Green-
berg, resigned in 2006, not because the firm inputted the wrong data into its
risk models, but because it had acted fraudulently under his leadership.95
The large banks that funded Enron's off-the-books deals knew that Enron's
book-keeping was a shell game designed to make the firm appear profitable
when it wasn't, but the banks kept making loans to it because it earned the
banks and their directors huge profits.96 Enron's directors should have
questioned the practices, but management appointed them to support its
decisions-not to challenge them on behalf of shareholders. Directors who
challenged management would likely lose any chance that other firms
would select them for their boards. 97
91. Rakesh Khurana & Andy Zelleke, You Can Cap The Pay, But The Greed Will Go On, WASH.
POST, Feb. 8, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/06/AR2009020602794.html.
92. Jill Drew, Frenzy, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2008, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/1 5/AR2008 121503561 .html.
93. Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Testimony before the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform of the U.S. House of Representatives: Testimony Concerning the
Role of Federal Regulators: Lessons from the Credit Crisis for the Future of Regulation (Oct. 23, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/tsiO2308cc.htm (agreeing with the earlier testi-
mony of the SEC's former chief accountant).
94. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Banks Bundled Bad Debt, Bet Against It and Won, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/business/24trading.html.
95. Jenny Anderson, Greenberg and A.I.G. Sever Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/29/business/29insure.html?ex= I269752400&en=50eee86b4d2305 I d
&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland.
96. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys IN THE ROOM (2003).
97. THE WASHINGTON POST cites Fabrizio Ferri of Harvard Business School as noting that if
you're a director and you go along with generous chief executive pay, "you get to sit on more boards."
David S. Hilzenrath, Executive Pay, WASH. POST Dec 21, 2008 available at
http://www.washingtonpost.con-/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/20/AR2008122000096.html.
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As criminal investigators, business reporters, and economic histori-
ans probe the behavior behind the financial implosion, I anticipate that they
will find less incompetence or ignorance of what banks were doing with
their shadow operations and more conscious venality, chicanery, and finan-
cial crime motivated by the chance to make huge sums of money. 98
Economics stresses conscious responses to incentives, but incentives
can affect behavior unconsciously as well. Scientists whose research is
supported by drug firms report more favorably on drugs than scientists
whose research is funded elsewhere. 99 Some recipients of drug company
support may consciously distort their results, but most presumably come up
with the "right" answers through unconscious decisions made during their
experiments. It is for this reason that the gold standard in clinical trials are
double-blind studies in which neither the researcher nor the subjects know
who is in the control or treatment groups and in which an independent lab
that does not know which specimens come from which group does assays. I
surmise that some of the amoral "greedy" decisions made by the bankers
and financiers reflected unconscious responses to incentives as well as
purposive policies to enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders,
consumers, or workers.
Factors beyond incentives are also likely to have contributed to the
amoral behavior by the leaders of finance. Many observers blame excessive
risk-taking and financial crime on the decline of moral standards in soci-
ety-the advent of Gordon Gecko morality that extolled greed and profits
above all else. 100 In December 2009, Jeff Imhelt of General Electric at-
98. Not until four years after the 1929 Crash did investigators arrest Charles Mitchell, a leading
banker, for evasion of income tax and not for another five years did they arrest the former head of the
Stock Exchange, Richard Whitney, for grand larceny. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT
CRASH 1929 (7th ed. 1961).
99. Thomas E. Finucane & Chad E. Boult, Association of Funding and Findings of Pharmaceuti-
cal Research at a Meeting of a Medical Professional Society, 117 AM. J. MED. 842, 843 (2004) (report-
ing that none of the 30 industry-supported studies that they examined gave a result unfavorable to the
drug studied whereas one-third of studies that were not industry-supported had unfavorable findings);
Joel Lexchin et al., Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and Quality: Systemic
Review, 326 BMJ 1167, 1168 (2003) (reporting that systematic bias favors products made by the com-
pany funding the research); Veronica Yank, Drummond Rennie & Lisa A. Bero, Financial Ties and
Concordance Between Results and Conclusions in Meta-analyses: Retrospective Cohort Study 335 BMJ
1202 (2007) (reporting that meta-analyses show that research with financial ties to one drug company
are not associated with favorable results but with favorable conclusions).
100. John McCain spoke of "greed, corruption and excess" as "Wall Street treated the American
economy like a casino." Rick Klein, McCain Blames Greed for Wall St. Mess; Obama Blames GOP,
ABC NEWS, Sept. 16, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/5050/story?id=5812268&page=l. Charles
Colson, the Watergate criminal who found new life as an evangelical prison ministry leader, declared
that the problem was "greed unchecked by any moral restraint."Charles Colson, Tipsy on Wall Street: A
President's Candid Comment, http://www.crosswalk.com/news/commentary/l 1579703/ (July 29,
2008). Greenspan referred to "an infectious greed [that] seemed to grip much of our business commu-
nity" as if greed was not the putative motivating force for market capitalism. Harry Binswanger, Green-
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tacked the executive class, of which he is a leading member: "We are at the
end of a difficult generation of business leadership... tough-mindedness, a
good trait, was replaced by meanness and greed, both terrible traits. Re-
wards became perverted. The richest people made the most mistakes with
the least accountability."']01 Because the crime rate in the U.S. fell substan-
tially in the same period, 102 it is difficult to blame this behavior on any
broad trend toward amoral or illegal actions. No roaring twenties Prohibi-
tion culture was sweeping the country. The meanness and greed was con-
centrated where those forms of behavior were most rewarded.
Another possible contributing factor to the behavior of financial
bosses was that Wall Street attracted persons with less moral reservations
about acceptable money-making behavior than it had in the past. 103 Selec-
tivity is an important part of labor supply behavior. If one takes Bill
Black's title "The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One"' 1 4 seriously, it
may be that the increased money at the top attracted persons with a greater
criminal mentality to banking industry than in the years when the sector
was less lucrative. Given the behavior of S&L bankers in the 1980s and of
tobacco firm executives from the 1960s through the 1990s, however, I
doubt that business leaders were any less moral in the rmn-up to the 2008
financial implosion than in earlier periods. It was simply that the incentives
for amoral behavior were greater.
Another proposed explanation for the high risk-taking in financial
markets is the "animal spirit" that Keynes viewed as a major force in
speculative booms. 105 Recent studies that relate risk-taking to endocrines in
span on "Infectious Greed", CAPITALISM MAGAZINE, http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=1825
(Aug. 30, 2002). Playing the Clinton mantra, one religious leader explained "it's the morality, sinner."
Ed Stoddard, Evangelicals see moral decline in Wall St. woes, REUTERS, Oct. 1, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4905RF20081001.
101. See Francesco Guerrera, GE Chief Attacks Executive 'Greed', FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/fel e3f7c-e507-1 Ide-9a25-00144feab49a.html?nclickcheck-Il.
102. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2005: TABLE 1,
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_01.html.
103. Laboratory studies of public goods games found that business students made fewer socially
desirable investments than students in other fields. Lorenz Goette, David Huffman & Stephan Meier,
The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm Enforcement: Evidence Using Random
Assignment to Real Social Groups, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 212 (2006). Stephan Meier and Bruno Frey
reported that selectivity was the main factor explaining the less socially responsible behavior of Swiss
business students than others. Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, Social Comparisons and Pro-social
Behavior: Testing "Conditional Cooperation " in a Field Experiment, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1717 (2004).
By contrast, Elizabeth Maynes and Charles Brain Cadsby reported that nurses made socially desirable
decisions. Charles Brain Cadsby & Elizabeth Maynes, Choosing between a socially efficient and free-
riding equilibrium: Nurses versus economics and business students, 37 J. OF ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 183
(1998).
104. WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK Is TO OWN ONE (2005).
105. "The instability proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather
than mathematical expectations, whether moral or hedonistic or economic... can only be taken as the
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the brain and that measure which parts of the brain "light up" when people
take financial risks provide a scientific underpinning for this hypothesis.
Studying floor traders in London, J.M. Coates and J. Herbert reported that
the traders' morning testosterone levels predicted trading results, while
their levels of cortisol rose with the variance of trading results.106 They
speculate that the steroids could shift risk preferences over time and affect
a trader's ability to make rational choices in risky situations. Apicella re-
ported that men with higher testosterone levels take greater risks in a finan-
cial investment game, 107 which led one news columnist to claim that "the
greedy architects of the new recession--can't help themselves." 108 Zald
found that persons with fewer mid-brain dopamine receptors are more
likely to take risks.109 Camelia Kuhnen and Brian Knutson related brain
regions innervated by serotonergic and dopaminergic neural pathways to
individuals' financial risk-taking behavior."l 0 Knutson showed that the
parts of the brain that light up with erotic pictures also light up with finan-
cial gambles and that young men make greater gambles after seeing sexu-
ally arousing pictures.1'1 Evidence that the genes that regulate dopamine
and serotonin are also significant in risk-taking in investment decisions
carries the biology story a step further. 1 2 Still, it is hard to generalize from
the brain activity of individuals to the aggregate market behavior of thou-
sands or tens of thousands of people. Excessive testosterone or insufficient
dopamine receptors may contribute to high risk-taking and short-termism,
but, as with morality, my guess is that this is of second order importance.
The famous Milgram social obedience 113 and Zimbardo Stanford
Prison1 14 experiments shocked social science by showing how easy it is to
result of animal spirits-a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a
weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities." JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 161 (1936).
106. J. M. Coates and J. Herbert, Endogenous Steroids and Financial Risk Taking on a London
Trading Floor, 105 PNAS 6167 (2008).
107. Coren L. Apicella et. al, Testosterone and Financial Risk Preferences, 29 EVOLUTION AND
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 384 (2008).
108. Shannon Rupp, Could We Blame the Financial Crisis on Too Much Testosterone? Harvard
Researchers Say Yes, ALTERNET, Oct. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.alternet.org/economy/1 03502/couldwe_blame_thefinancial-crisisontoomuchtestoste
roneharvardresearcherssayyes/.
109. David H. Zald et al., Midbrain Dopamine Receptor Availability Is Inversely Associated with
Novelty-Seeking Traits in Humans, 28 J. OF NEUROSCIENCE 14372 (2008).
110. Camelia M. Kuhnen & Brian Knutson, The Neural Basis of Financial Risk Taking, 47
NEURON 763 (2005).
lI1. Brian Knutson et al., Nucleus Accumbens Activation Mediates the Influence of Reward Cues
on Financial Risk-Taking, 19 NEUROREPORT 509 (2008)
112. Camelia M. Kuhnen & Joan Y. Chiao, Genetic Determinants of Financial Risk Taking, 4
PLOS ONE, Feb. 2009, at 1 (2009).
113. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974).
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induce people to behave reprehensibly. 115 They also provide insight into
the behavior in finance in the 1990s-2000s. Financial firms have a culture
in which the sole goal is to make money. If it is relatively easy to motivate
people to give huge electric shocks to others in an experiment or to treat
"prisoners" badly in a fake prison situation, it is presumably even easier to
motivate people to exploit regulatory loopholes and take advantage of
shareholder or consumer ignorance or worker weakness to make money in
institutions devoted to money-making. Just as the pretty lady in the apocry-
phal Groucho Marx story could see herself sleeping with the man for one
million dollars but not for one dollar, 116 1 imagine that if the earnings from
financial crime were lower, Ken Lay, Bernard Madoff, and the other lead-
ers of finance and business who betrayed their responsibility to society
might have behaved honorably, whereas with sufficiently high stakes even
presumptively honest folk like you or me could find ourselves selling risky
securities as if they were safe, reporting revenues and costs in ways that put
our options in the money, or betting against collateralized debt obligations
that we sold to clients as safe investments.
In short, the hypothesis that seems most relevant to understanding the
behavior that led Wall Street to disaster is the orthodox economic "every
man has his price" 117 theorem that stresses the power of incentives to in-
duce people to undertake actions they might not otherwise do. The implica-
tion of this analysis is the opposite of the usual supply-side claim that huge
inequalities are needed to motivate those at the top to make the best deci-
sions. To the contrary, it suggests that smaller rewards at the top are needed
114. PHILLIP G. ZIMBARDO, QUIET RAGE: THE STANFORD PRISON EXPERIMENT (1971).
115. Dominick Packer reports that about two-thirds of the participants in the Milgram experiment
went beyond 150 volts where the person being shocked yelled "Stop, let me out" while about half kept
administering the punishment to the 450 volts at which the experiment ended. Dominic J. Packer,
Identifying Systematic Disobedience in Milgram 's Obedience Experiments: A Meta-Analytic Review, 3
PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL. Su. 301, 302 (2008). Burger replicated the finding that two-thirds went
beyond the 150 volts. See Jerry Burger, Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today?, 64
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 1 (2009). The economics experiment would be to see how such behavior
responded to monetary incentives: would more people go to the 450 volts if paid to do so.
116.
Groucho Marx to some film starlet: Would you sleep with me for a million dollars?
Actress: Yes.
Groucho: Would you sleep with me for a a dollar?
Actress: No! What do you think I am?
Groucho: I thought we had established that and we're now haggling over the price.
See http://forums.joltonline.com/archive/index.php/t-428624.html; see also
http://letters.salon.com/mwt/broadsheet/2008/09/09/virginity/view/?show--all. This story is also attrib-
uted to George Bernard Shaw, Winston Churchill, and Mark Twain. See Wikipedia, George Bernard
Shaw, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/George-BemardLShaw (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
117. See e.g., Sir Robert Walpole, Ist Earl of Orford, in 10 NOTES AND QUERIES: A MEDIUM OF
INTERCOMMUNICATION FOR LITERARY MEN, GENERAL READERS, ETC. 368 (1907).
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to reduce the amount of "bogus" money-making and unscrupulous risk-
taking that underlay the Wall Street implosion. Lower pay at the top, which
means less inequality overall, is better for the economy, at least at the lev-
els of earnings that preceded the implosion of Wall Street and that, at this
writing, are still found among the bankers and executives running major
U.S. public corporations." 18
3. What Went Wrong: The Incentives to Regulate
All economies have legal rules and regulations to protect property and
regulate economic transactions. The limited liability corporation did not
develop in an Arrow-Debreu vacuum but arose as a product of corporate
law with rights, privileges, and liabilities distinct from those of its mem-
bers.11 9 Legal protection of property rights is widely viewed as one of the
necessary elements for a free-market, capitalist economy. 120 In finance, the
U.S. and other countries regulate transactions in diverse ways, such as lim-
iting margin purchases of shares, outlawing insider trading, and requiring
that banks and insurance companies meet certain capital requirements to
conduct their business. 121 The crash of the stock market and collapse of
commercial banking in 1933 led Congress to enact the Glass-Steagall Act
to separate commercial banking from the riskier investment banking; to
create the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to insure deposits; and to
establish the SEC a year later to monitor securities firms, brokers, invest-
ment advisers, rating agencies, and private regulatory organizations. Myr-
iad other federal agencies are involved in monitoring and regulating
finance. In addition, state attorney generals have the right to enforce state
"fair lending" laws and regulations-a right recently upheld by the Su-
preme Court in Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, L.L. C.122 over the
objections of the Obama Administration. At the top of the financial sector,
the Federal Reserve is responsible for maintaining the stability of the finan-
cial system and containing systemic risk in financial markets.
Deregulation weakened the authority of federal agencies over banks
and financial houses, but regulators still had sufficient power to influence
118. Edmund L. Andrews & Vikas Bajaj, U.S. Plans $500,000 Cap on Executive Pay in Bailouts,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/business/04pay.htmlU.
119. Similarly the trade union is a product of labor law with rights, privileges, and liabilities dis-
tinct from its members.
120. JAMES GWARTNEY & ROBERT LAWSON, ECONOMic FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 2009 ANNUAL
REPORT 6 (2009), available at http://www.freetheworld.com/2009/reports/world/EFW2009chl .pdf.
121. See, e.g., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation (Jan. 20, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
122. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 129 S.Ct. 2710 (2009).
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the behavior of those firms had they acted aggressively. Prior to the finan-
cial implosion, however, the top regulators showed no desire to do their
job. In 2000, Federal Reserve Commissioner Ned Gramlich expressed con-
cern over rising house prices and urged Fed examiners to investigate mort-
gage lenders affiliated with national banks. 123 Greenspan ignored him. In
2001, "Treasury official Sheila C. Bair tried to persuade subprime lenders
to adopt a code of 'best practices."I' 1 24 They shrugged her off and the Bush
Administration's Treasury Department did nothing. 125 From 2000 through
2008, certified fraud examiner Harry Markopolous presented the SEC with
evidence that Bernard Madoff was running a Ponzi scheme.126 To make the
point crystal clear Markapolous's 2005 report was titled "The World's
Largest Hedge Fund is a Fraud."'1 27 The agency did nothing.
B. Why Did Regulators Abscond from their Responsibilities?
Some regulators had an ideological opposition to intervening in mar-
kets. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, whose agency had the
greatest responsibility for maintaining a stable banking system, seems to
have been ideologically blind to reality. Though he had defended Charles
Keatings' Lincoln Savings and Loan bank during the 1980s S&L disas-
ter128 and saw LTCM collapse during his watch at the Federal Reserve,
Greenspan ignored multiple warnings to address the dangers posed by sub-
prime lending. He believed that the market embodied all of the relevant
123. Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Shrugged as Subprime Crisis Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/18/business/18subprime.html.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Harry Markopolos, Chartered Financial Analyst, Certified Fraud Examiner, Testimony before
the House Comm. on Fin. Servs. (Feb. 4, 2009), available at
http://online.wsj.con-t/public/resources/documents/MarkopolosTestimony2009O2O3.pdf
127. Michael Richardson, Madoffs $50 billion swindle was Reported to SEC for years by Boston
watchdog with no agency action, EXAMINER.COM, Jan. 8, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/x-1969-
Boston-Progressive-Examiner-y2009ml d8-Madoffs-50-billion-swindle-was-reported-to-SEC-for-
years-by-watchdog-with-no-agency-action.
128. In 1985 Greenspan sought to gain Lincoln Savings an exemption from a rule forbidding
substantial investments in risky activities. Nathaniel C. Nash, Greenspan 's Lincoln Savings Regret,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1989, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/20/business/greenspan-s-
lincoln-savings-regret.html. When the bank went bankrupt and Keating was found to be a crook, Green-
span was "thoroughly surprised by what has happened to Lincoln." Id. Later, as head of the Federal
Reserve, Greenspan worked with the first Bush Administration to bail out the S&L sector, agreeing to
pump billions of dollars in loans into threatened thrifts if necessary. John H. Berry, Fed Pledges Tem-
porary Aid to S&Ls; Funds Promised Until Bailout Plan Is Law, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1989, available
at
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/73780076.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&dat
e=Feb+24%2C+l 989&author=-John+M.+Berry&pub=The+Washington+Post+(pre-
1997+Fulltext)&edition=&startpage=f.01 &desc=Fed+Pledges+Temporary+Aid+to+S%26Ls%3B+Fun
ds+Promised+Until+Bailout+Plan+Is+Law.
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information and, accordingly, he believed that it was impossible for a regu-
lator to do any better.
In other cases it was the politicians who sought to prevent regulators
doing their job. In 2005, the head of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, William Donaldson, resigned after criticism from the Bush admini-
stration when he sought to have the agency take a more active regulatory
role. 129 They replaced him with Christopher Cox, a former Republican
congressman ideologically committed to do as little regulation as possi-
ble.130
But in the failure to. regulate there is also a large role for economic
self-interest. Top government officials often work for the sectors that they
regulate. Some come from the sector, which usually makes them sensitive
to its interests. Some obtain lucrative jobs in the sector when they leave the
government. Robert Rubin and Henry Paulson were Goldman Sachs chair-
men before becoming Secretary of Treasury. 131 Rubin went from Secretary
of Treasury to Senior Counselor and Chairman of Citigroup-which bene-
fited from the repeal of Glass-Steagall that he had championed-where he
earned $115 million for the advice and leadership that eventually brought
Citigroup to the brink of bankruptcy.132 Prior to becoming chief economic
advisor to President Obama, Larry Summers received millions of dollars
from the hedge fund D.E. Shaw and huge speaking fees from other Wall
Street firms. 133 Leaving the Federal Reserve, Greenspan took a job with the
investment management firm PIMCO-which has close ties with the
Treasury and the Federal Reserve-and joined the advisory board of the
hedge fund Paulson & Co.134 And so on. Someone paid huge sums in the
129. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. 's Chairman Is Stepping Down From Split Panel, N.Y.TIMES, June 2,
2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/02/business/02sec.html?_r "= 1 &pagewantedprint.
130. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 27,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com2008/09/27/business/27sec.html?pagewanted=print. This
produced Calvin Trillin's limerick: "Though Donaldson came from the Street,
He plainly was policing his beat. And so they replaced him with Cox. The henhouse goes back to a
fox." Calvin Trillin, William Donaldson is Replaced. THE NATION, June 27, 2005, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050627/trillin.
131. Fred Lucas, In Goldman Sachs We Trust: How The Left's Favorite Bank Influences Public
Policy, FOUND. WATCH, Oct. 2008, 1, 3, available at
http://www.capitalresearch.org/pubs/pdf/v 1222698871 .pdf.
132. Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, The Reckoning: Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It Made
Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov 23, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23citi.html?pagewanted=all; Ken Brown & David
Enrich, Rubin, under Fire, Defends His Role at Citi- 'Nobody Was Prepared'for Crisis of '08, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 29, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122791795940965645.html.
133. John D. McKinnon & T.W. Famam, Hedge Fund Paid Summers $5.2 Million in Past Year,
WALL ST. J., April 5, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123879462053487927.html.
134. Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam, Greenspan Helped Pimco Make Billons, Gross Says (Update3),
BLOOMBERG.COM, May 21, 2008, available at
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past or likely to receive huge sums in the future by the firms that he/she
regulates or sets policy for is likely to make decisions more favorable to
that group than someone with no such monetary links.
The technical word for officials becoming so entwined with the group
they regulate that they are more likely to represent the interests of that
group than that of the public is "regulatory capture." Galbraith described
the process in life cycle terms: "In youth [regulatory agencies] are vigor-
ous, aggressive .... Later they mellow, and in old age-after a matter of
ten or fifteen years-they become, with some exceptions either an arm of
the industry they are regulating or senile."' 35 There is a psychological
component to this, as regulators invariably spend lots of time with the peo-
ple they are regulating and begin to see things from the perspective of those
people, per the Stockholm or Patty Hearst syndrome in which kidnap vic-
tims sympathize and identify with their kidnappers. 136 But many persons in
top executive branch jobs have no need to "go native" as they were them-
selves former Wall Street operatives. The Obama administration-like the
Bush administration, Clinton administration, and other administrations
before it-appoints former employees of Wall Street to important jobs in
the Treasury Department and elsewhere in the government, presumptively
because of their expertise in the industry. The Wall Street firms encourage
their top employees to accept such jobs, presumably as a way to give them
influence over decisions.
Arguably more important than regulatory capture of agencies, how-
ever, is what might be called the political capture of politicians. This occurs
through the interested groups making large campaign contributions and
deploying armies of lobbyists to argue their case with Congress and agen-
cies. Between 1998 and 2008, the financial sector-finance, insurance, and
real estate-contributed $1.74 billion to political campaigns and spent
$3.44 billion on lobbying for a total investment in political capture of $5.18
billion. 137 In 2007, the financial sector employed 2,996 lobbyists-many of
whom were previously high-ranking officials or employees in the Execu-
tive Branch or Congress. 138 Wall Street firms contributed disproportion-
ately to politicians on banking and finance committees. THE NEW YORK
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aifsOWlwkqYM&refer-home; Devin
Leonard, Treasury's Got Bill Gross on Speed Dial, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/2I/business/21 gross.html.
135. GALBRAITH, supra note 98, at 171.
136. Laura Fitzpatrick, Stockholm Syndrome, TIME, Aug. 31, 2009, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,191 9757,00.html.
137. ROBERT WEISSMAN & JAMES DONAHUE, SOLD OUT: How WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON
BETRAYED AMERICA, 103 (2009), available at http://www.walistreetwatch.org/reports/soldout.pdf.
138. Id. at 100.
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TIMES noted that before the financial implosion Senator Schumer of New
York "embraced the industry's free-market, deregulatory agenda more than
almost any other Democrat in Congress, even backing some measures now
blamed for contributing to the crisis."1 39 Finance is an important New York
industry, and financial firms contributed heavily to the Democratic Senato-
rial Campaign Committee which Schumer headed. In 2009, Wall Street
donated $1.65 million to Schumer -nearly twice that of any other sena-
tor. 1
40
Finally, there is the capture of regulators by the mood of the times.
The American saying is "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." The British say
"Leave well enough alone." The Evita song is:
When the money is rolling in you don't ask how .... When the money
keeps rolling out you don't keep books. You can tell you've done well
by the happy grateful looks. Accountants only slow things down, figures
get in the way .... Rolling, rolling, rolling. 14 1
From the late 1990s through the mid 2000s, the country applauded Green-
span for letting things roll. The same pressures to let things roll operate
inside firms. A CEO who tried to stop investment managers from selling
lucrative toxic assets to clients at the height of the Wall Street bubble
would have found the managers shifting to firms where they could sell
those securities and make lots of money. The loss of investment managers
and short term profits would have put the CEO's career in jeopardy.
In 1961, President Eisenhower warned the U.S. about the industrial-
military complex: "In the councils of government, we must guard against
the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by
the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of
misplaced power exists and will persist."' 142 Today, he would warn the
country about the "financial-political complex" and possibly add additional
commentary on the difficulty of reducing that influence once the complex
has gained it.
139. Eric Lipton & Raymond Hemandez, The Reckoning: A Champion of Wall Street Reaps Bene-
fits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/business/14schumer.html. Schumer led Democratic support for
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Bill, sought to limit efforts to regulate credit-rating agencies, stopped a pro-
posal to double taxes on executives at hedge funds and private equity firms, and helped enact legislation
that cut fees from Wall Street firms to the SEC, thereby limiting the agency's ability to fund regulatory
activities. Id.
140. National Journal.com, Schumer Gets The Most Money From Wall Street, NAT'L J.'S UNDER
THE INFLUENCE, Sept. 28, 2009, available at
http://undertheinfluence.nationaljournal.com/2009/09/schumer-gets-the-most-money-fr.php.
141. TIM RICE & ANDREW LLOYD WEBBER, And The Money Kept Rolling In (And Out), on
HIGHLIGHTS FROM EVITA (MCA Records 1976).
142. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 17, 1961), available at
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/dwightdeisenhowerfarewell.html.
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C. Reforming Finance: Countervailing Power of Labor to the Rescue?
After the collapse of the U.S. financial market in 2008 and the mas-
sive bailout of the sector and stimulus of the real economy, I anticipated
that the U.S. would move decisively to reform banking and finance, as the
Roosevelt Administration had done in the early 1930s. 143 There could be
no more propitious time to fix the Achilles heel of capitalism and rebuild
the American economic model. 144 Given what Wall Street had done to the
economy, what politician would dare oppose reforming finance? Surely the
bankers saved by government moneys would lie low in Washington de-
bates over the direction of reforms. To my surprise, the opposite has oc-
curred. Once government moneys restored stability to financial markets,
the bankers went back to their usual business. After the federal government
promised billions to bail out AIG, the company spent $444,000 for execu-
tives to party at an exclusive California spa. 145 Nearly half a million for a
party paid by bailout moneys? Chickenfeed. The head of AIG complained
about efforts to rein in its pay on the grounds that the firm would have
trouble attracting and retaining "the best and the brightest ... if employees
believe that their compensation is subject to continued and arbitrary ad-
justment by the U.S. Treasury."146 In 2008, nine Wall Street investment
banks that relied on TARP money and government support for their sur-
vival managed to find nearly $33 billion to pay in executive and employee
performance bonuses. 147 In 2009, reveling in the huge profits that Goldman
Sachs made after government guarantees, access to cheap money, and the
favorable treatment its friends in Washington had given the firm, Gold-
man's CEO, Lloyd Blankfein, declared that the bank was "doing God's
143. In its first year, it enacted Glass-Steagall Act and the Securities Act of 1933 to protect pur-
chasers of shares. BASIL RAUCH, THE HISTORY OF THE NEW DEAL 57, 82-83 (1944). In year two it
established the SEC and the Federal Housing Administration to provide mortgage insurance for home
purchases. Id. at 137, 170.
144. In 2009, seventy-five percent of Americans were dissatisfied with banking. Press Release,
Alix Partners, thirty-six percent of Likely Voters Say Attitude Toward Banks Will Affect their Vote
(Dec. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.alixpartners.com/en/MediaCenter/PressReleases/tabid/58/language/en-
US/ltemlD/29/Default.aspx. Trust in banking fell more than trust in any other industry between 2008
and 2009. EDELMAN, 2009 EDELMAN TRUST BAROMETER 11 (2009),
http://www.edelman.com/trust/2009/docs/Trust_Book_Final_2.pdf.
145. Associated Press, AIG Draws Fire for Executives' $440,000 Post-Bailout Retreat at Posh
California Resort, Oct. 7, 2008, available at http://www.foxnews.comstory0,2933,434223,00.html.
146. Gene Bloch, Treasury pressure leads to AIG scaling back bonuses, CNN.COM, Mar. 15, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/03/14/aig.bonuses/index.html.
147. Susanne Craig & Deborah Solomon, Bank Bonus Tab: $33 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 31,
2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 124896891815094085.html.
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work."'148 Public outrage forced the heads of Goldman, JP Morgan, and
Citigroup, among others, to forgo or reduce the bonuses for themselves, but
they still paid massive amounts to others in their firms and gave themselves
options and shares that would benefit from increased share prices in place
of their regular bonuses. 149 And nothing stopped the banks from using their
recovered profitability to contribute to politicians and lobby against re-
forms that might reduce their power and income. In 2009, financial institu-
tions gave some $78 million to federal candidates and party committees-
more money than any other sector-and signed up seventy former mem-
bers of Congress as lobbyists. 150
Despite widespread concern about the moral hazard of banks "too big
to fail," not until the Democrats lost the January 2010 Massachusetts elec-
tion did the Obama Administration begin to address ways to shrink the
remaining big banks or separate commercial and investment banking. 151
Neither the Administration nor Congress sought to reform the credit-rating
industry that had failed abysmally to differentiate safe from risky securities,
presumably in part because the industry got its income from the firms that
issue securities. Similarly, at this writing, there is no effort to regulate
hedge funds, put derivatives trades on a regular exchange, or consider more
radical ideas such as requiring that new financial products meet some risk
standards before being issued (just as new drugs must meet U.S. Food and
Drug Administration tests before approved for sale) or of limiting the in-
vestment of tax-privileged moneys such as pensions in relatively safe vehi-
cles. Seemingly less subject to political and regulatory capture, the head of
the United Kingdom's Financial Services Agency, Adair Turner, and the
head of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, pressed for their government
to undertake more dramatic changes, such as taxing financial transactions
or breaking up the big banks. 152
148. John Arlidge, I'm Doing 'God's Work'. Meet Mr. Goldman Sachs, THE TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009,
available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us and-americas/article6907681.ece.
149. Michael Shnayerson, The Economic Crisis, Wall Street's $18.4 Billon Bonus, VANITY FAIR,
March 2009, available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/03/wall-street-
bonuses200903.
150. Elizabeth Newlin Carney, Big Banks Are Back In The Lobbying Game, NAT'L J.'S UNDER THE
INFLUENCE, http://undertheinfluence.nationaljournal.com/2009/ 2/big-banks-are-back-in-the-lobb.php.
151. Michael Hirsch, Web Exclusive, The Politics of Hubris, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 20, 2010, available
at http://www.newsweek.com/id/231674. Senators McCain and Cantwell proposed reinstating Glass-
Steagall which the Obama Administration Treasury dismissed derisively: "going back to Glass-Steagall
would be like going back to the Walkman." Michael Hirsch, Web Exclusive, An Odd Post-Crash
Couple, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/226938.
152. Adair Turner, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Agency, Mansion House Speech (Sept. 22, 2009), avail-
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The high water mark for reform in 2009 was the House of Representa-
tives' bill that establishes a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA)
to protect consumers against unfair practices in mortgages and credit cards
and imposes greater oversight and capital requirements for the largest
banks and Wall Street firms. 153 At the same time, however, the bill took a
step backwards by including a federal preemption clause that forbids states
from adding greater protections for consumers.1 54 At year's end, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and other business groups began a major media
campaign to derail the CFPA. 155 If they weaken it enough and keep states
from acting independently to protect citizens, the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Agency might end up actually strengthening their ability to deceive
consumers about their products. Given that the Senate seems less attuned to
financial reform, the final outcome is likely to be something far weaker
than the House bill in any case.
To the extent that my analysis that "the money made them do it" is a
correct reading of what produced the risk-taking, chicanery, and financial
crime or near-crime that led to the Wall Street implosion, the failure to seek
reforms in executive pay packages suggests that much the same behavior
will continue. It is not a matter of lack of policy instruments to regulate
compensation. There are ways in which government actions can pressure
firms to alter executive compensation. 156 Congress could use the tax sys-
tem to change executive compensation, for instance, by allowing firms to
deduct bonus pay or options as costs of business only if that pay is tied to
long-term performance or includes claw-back provisions. It could seek
changes in corporate governance to strengthen the position of shareholders
on executive compensation. It could make backdating options illegal. It
could introduce non-compete clauses for top government officials to con-
strain the financial-political complex. The Treasury's special master for
compensation, Kenneth Feinberg, has sought to limit pay in firms with
153. Shahien Nasiripour & Jeff Muskus, House Passes Wall Street Reform Bill With Zero GOP
Votes, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 11, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/1 l/house-passes-
financial-re_n_389267.html.
154. Arthur Delaney, Melissa Bean: A Democrat Bankers Bank On, HUFFINOTON POST, Feb. 10,
2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/02/melissa-bean-a-democrat-
b n 400993.html?view=print. The amendment was introduced by Representative Melissa Bean of
Illinois, who received considerable campaign contributions from Wall Street. Id.
155. Peter H. Stone, Chamber Guns for CFPA, NAT'L J.'S UNDER THE INFLUENCE, Dec. 17, 2009,
available at http://undertheinfluence.nationaljoumal.com/2009/12/chamber-plans-cfpa-attacks.php.
156. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried provide one analysis but others also address the issues.
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TARP moneys, though seemingly with limited success. 157 Many of the
firms have repaid the moneys rapidly so that the top executives can once
again cash in big time. 158 Others have pressed back at restrictions, leading
one observer to compare the pay czar to a puppy up against a bunch of
nasty alley cats.1 59 The United Kingdom seems to have been more success-
ful, at least in 2009, in addressing compensation issue. It raised its top mar-
ginal rate by ten percentage points so that the wealthy would pay more of
the cost for saving the bank sector. 160 A more progressive income tax al-
most surely reduces incentives at the top. The United Kingdom also im-
posed a fifty percent tax on banks paying staff bonuses of more than
£25,000, despite the complaints and threats from the industry. 161 Barring a
second collapse of the U.S. financial sector, there seems little likelihood
that the U.S. will undertake major reforms in its mode of compensation or
operation, unless new powerful groups emerge to challenge Wall Street and
its minions on the appropriate rules and regulations to reduce the incentives
for risk-taking, chicanery, and financial crime that endanger the real econ-
omy. In my Piper Lecture in March 2009, I suggested that the only way
such a challenge could emerge would be if groups concerned with the well-
being of workers, from trade unions to NGOs, placed both financial reform
and building a new financial architecture for sustainable growth at the top
of their agenda. From the perspective of standard economics, the notion
that unions and public interest groups, be they on the right or left of the
political spectrum, might improve the operation of the economy by provid-
ing a "balance" or "countervailing power" to the forces of capital is a radi-
cal one. Standard models generate desirable market outcomes through
competition among agents on the same side of the market. These models
have no place for third parties or competition between groups on opposite
sides of the market.
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159. Brent Dyer, 'Pay czar' watchdog looks like puppy, AUSTIN Bus. J., Jan. 1, 2010, available at
http://www.bizjoumals.com/austin/stories/2010/01/04/editorial2.html.
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http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/it.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2010); Ashley Seager & Kathryn Hopkins,
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Dec. 14, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704193004574588223449160530.html.
2010]
CHICA GO-KENT LA WREVIEW
But the problem of reforming a sector is not the same as the problem
of reaching an appropriate market solution conditional on a given set of
legal rules and regulations for the operation of the market. When the rules
for the way markets operate are at stake, countervailing power between
parties on different sides of a market-labor and capital-may be not only
important in generating good social outcomes, but potentially necessary. It
is even possible that countervailing power can produce economic outcomes
closer to the free-market ideal than outcomes generated by a system in
which one side of the market-capital-writes its own rules.
Calling for countervailing power from labor to reform the financial
sector and build a new U.S. economic model may seem unrealistic to many.
Just one year after the Wall Street Journal declared the death of Wall
Street, 162 the surviving banks seem as powerful in Washington as before
while, by contrast, the strength of labor has seemingly fallen. In 2009, the
share of workers in private sector unions dropped to a bare 7.2 percent. 163
The Service Employees International Union, one of the country's most
dynamic organizations, is engaged in internal strife with its workers. 164 The
union movement has largely given up on the Employee Free Choice Act,
on which it had pinned great hopes for limiting employer opposition to
unionism. 165
At the same time, however, there is an increasing recognition that re-
form of finance for the benefit of citizens outside of Wall Street requires
greater activism on the part of groups outside of the small world of finance
and financial experts. In 2009, nearly 200 U.S. organizations, of which the
AFL-CIO is among the most prominent, formed the Americans for Finan-
cial Reform to spearhead a campaign for reform in banking and finance.
The statement below from the group's website is the clarion call for new
voices and influences in reforming the U.S. financial sector:
For too long, the rules of Wall Street have been written by the bankers
themselves. This year, that has to change.... The reckless and greedy
behavior of big Wall Street banks caused a financial crisis that is costing
162. Opinion, The End of Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008, at A28.
163. James Sherk, Majority of Union Members Now Work for the Government, WALL ST. J., Jan.
22, 2010, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704509704575019552907349936.html.
164. See Mark Brenner, Service Employees Vote to Split United Healthcare Workers- West, Mem-
bers calls for Disaffiliation, LABORNOTES, Jan. 9, 2009, http://www.labomotes.org/node/2025; Steven
Greehouse, California: Union Wins Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2OlO/04/10/us/l0brfs-UNIONWINSDAMBRF.html; Mike Parker, SEIU vs.
NUH-W: Who Owns the Union?, LABORNOTES, Apr. 11, 2010, http://labomotes.org/blogs/2010/04/seiu-
vs-nuhw-who-owns-union.
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us millions of jobs, billions of dollars in taxpayer funded bailouts, and
trillions of dollars in lost homes and lost savings. We cannot afford to let
this behavior continue.... Through a coordinated campaign, we are
working to clean up Wall Street's mess and ensure that the job of rewrit-
ing the regulatory rulebook is not left to the inside players and financial
predators who caused the problems we now face. Our goal is to see real
financial reform legislation this year, during this unprecedented opportu-
nity to win a more secure financial future. 166
III. CONCLUSION
The 2008-2009 financial meltdown and ensuing economic devel-
opments have shown three things about modem capitalism:
1) Unfettered financial markets remain the Achilles heel of capitalism
with the capability of destroying economic stability and bringing misery to
all. Letting Wall Street be Wall Street in the belief that the market will
police itself has proven to be an ideological pipe dream.
2) High-powered incentives paid to "talent" in finance are a funda-
mental cause of the excessive risk-taking, chicanery, and financial fraud
that contributes to instability. Without a new compensation system that
rewards banking and finance for contributing to sustainable economic pro-
gress rather than for economic rent-seeking and a renewed regulatory sys-
tem that punishes chicanery and financial crime and near-crime, there is
unlikely to be any change in the behavior of the financial world.
3) In the wake of the implosion of laissez faire finance, labor and al-
lied groups have to participate in rewriting the rules and regulations gov-
erning banking and finance so that finance serves the real economy rather
than the reverse. If Wall Street insiders make the key policy decisions
without our input, as they have in the past thirty or so years, banking and
finance will remain a loose cannon on the good ship Capitalism, sure to
crash the ship yet again.
166. Americans for Financial Reform, About, http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/about/ (last visited
Mar. 18, 2010).
2010]

STUDENT NOTES

